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Abstract 
Pension expenditure is a concern for the sustainability of public finances in the European 
Union. Therefore, assessing pension expenditure determinants is crucial. This study aims 
to disentangle the impact of demographic and economic variables, such as ageing, 
productivity, and unemployment, on pension expenditure. Using Portuguese time-series 
data, from 1975 to 2014, statistical evidence was found of co-integration between 
unemployed people aged between 15 and 64 years old, apparent productivity of labour, 
the old-age dependence index and pension expenditure as a share of gross domestic 
product. The use of a vector error correction model, with impulse-response functions and 
variance decomposition, showed that ageing has an almost insignificant impact in the 
long-run, when compared with unemployment and productivity. 
JEL Classification: C32, C51, C52, H55 







There is worldwide increasing interest in the analysis of the impact of ageing, 
productivity, and unemployment on pension expenditure. European social security 
systems are concerned with the rise of pension expenditure which motivated several 
reforms including adjusting the age eligibility for a pension benefit and adjusting the size 
of the pension benefit (Eurogroup 2016; Eurogroup 2017; European Commission, 2014). 
However, public pension systems are expected to experience a pattern of increasing 
expenditures from the early years of its existence and until a pension scheme reaches a 
state of maturity (Plamondon et al. 2002). After a period of 65 to 70 years, under stable 
conditions, the expenditure of a scheme expressed as a percentage of insured earnings 
normally stabilizes, since the first generation of young new entrants to the scheme has 
passed through the various stages of participation. Indeed, pension schemes mature very 
slowly, that is, over many decades (Cichon et al. 2004). Moreover, increasing pension 
expenditures are a perfectly normal phenomenon during the maturation phase of national 
pension schemes, which lasts several decades. Rising pension expenditures per se are not 
necessarily indicative of a financial sustainability issue. Therefore, the design of pension 
financing systems should accommodate this expected growth of pension expenditure. 
Indeed, pension privatization policies, implemented in a number of countries, as a 
consequence of the concern with the pattern of increasing pension expenditure (World 
Bank, 1994), did not deliver the expected results, as coverage and benefits did not 
increase, systemic risks were transferred to individuals and fiscal positions worsened 
(Beattie and McGillivray, 1995; ILO, 2018). Consequently, several countries are 




In addition, recent austerity or fiscal consolidation trends affected the adequacy 
of pension systems and general conditions of retirement, putting at risk the fulfilment of 
the minimum standards in social security and, consequently, the contribution of public 
pension systems to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (ILO, 2017; ILO, 2018). 
 Few studies are available regarding the factors that influence the evolution of 
Portuguese pension expenditure, and whether there is a link between pension expenditure 
as a dependent variable and other relevant explanatory variables, including the most 
recent developments on relevant variables, covering the current environment and data.  
This paper aims to understand which variables have a relevant influence on social 
security pension expenditure using econometric techniques that include a vector error 
correction model (VECM).  
In the next section we describe the Portuguese public pension system. Next we 
review the literature covering the impact of ageing on several macroeconomic variables 
especially pension expenditure. In the methods section, we present our data and method. 
In the following section, we show our estimation results.  Last sections provide the 
discussion and the conclusion.  
The Portuguese Pension System 
The Portuguese pension system is an earnings-related public pension scheme with a 
means-tested safety net (OECD, 2015), which is financed both by contributions from 
employees, employers, and by transfers from the State budget. 
Throughout its existence, several measures have been enacted to allegedly reinforce the 
pension system’s financial sustainability, such as the creation of the public pension 
reserve fund in 1989, and the convergence of the civil servants’ scheme with the public 




In 2007, a sustainability factor was introduced for the calculation of the old age 
pension benefit, reducing it so that it takes life expectancy into account. This was further 
changed in 2013, with a decrease in the pension benefit, although this only covered early 
retirement. This reform, whose effects will mainly be felt in the medium and long term, 
also intended to promote the financial sustainability of the public finances, reducing the 
expected value of future pension expenditure and replacement rates. Simultaneously, as 
a consequence of the Portuguese bailout in 2011 (European Commission, 2011), a 
extraordinary solidarity contribution was also introduced which decreased all pension 
income.   
In 2013, the normal retirement age was established 66 years in 2014, but increased 
to 66 years and two months in 2015, following the automatic process of adjusting the 
normal age of retirement by two-thirds of gains in life expectancy from age 65, measured 
as the average of the previous two years (Garcia, 2017). 
In summary, Portugal essentially has a pay-as-you-go pension scheme (World 
Bank, 2006), which represents the major source of retirement income, with occupational 
and personal pension funds only existing to a minor extent (Blake, 2006; European 
Parliament, 2011; Garcia, 2017). The Portuguese system is also a defined-benefit system 
(European Commission, 2015), offering pensioners more measurable post-employment 
income benefits (Ramaswamy, 2012). Pensions are indexed to prices and gross domestic 
product (European Commission, 2015). 
Literature Review 
Demographic aging and its impact on pension expenditure brought to the debate the need 




Roach and Ackerman (2005) show that a wide range of existing policy options 
could be used to secure the finances of the U.S.A. social security programme over the 
next 75 years without major structural changes, whereby it will continue to provide 
beneficiaries with a stable and predictable source of retirement income.   These authors 
believe that the system is not in crisis and that it cannot go bankrupt as long as revenues 
continue to be collected.  
Ramaswamy (2012) stress the ideas that lower payroll tax revenues during a 
period of high unemployment and rising fiscal deficits are a test of the sustainability of 
pay-as-you-go public pension schemes, as well as poor financial market returns and low 
long-term real interest rates, which create challenges for the defenders of defined benefit 
pension schemes. 
To limit public expenses, pension benefits might be decreased, however 
retirement income adequacy is a concern (European Parliament, 2011; Chybalski and 
Marcinkiewicz, 2014). Orenstein (2011) calls attention to the fact that, from 1981 to 2007, 
more than thirty countries worldwide fully or partially replaced their pre‐existing pay‐as‐
you‐go pension systems with ones based on individual, private savings accounts in a 
process often labelled “pension privatisation”. However, pension privatization did not 
deliver the expected results (ILO, 2018), revealing limited effects on capital markets and 
economic growth. In fact, coverage rates and pension benefits decreased, the risk of 
financial market fluctuations was shifted to individuals, and administrative costs 
increased. Moreover, the high costs of transition created large fiscal pressures. In 
addition, private pension fund administration did not improve governance as, frequently, 
the regulatory and supervisory functions were captured by economic groups responsible 




Cipriani (2014) uses an overlapping generations model with a pay-as-you-go 
pension system to conclude that population ageing due to increased longevity implies a 
reduction in pension benefits. However, the effects of aging on pensions may not be 
negative if the elderly are free to choose their retirement age, while they are always 
negative in the case of full retirement (Cipriani, 2016). 
Halmosi (2014) emphasises that the study of the pension systems of developed 
countries is a priority issue in light of the 2008 economic crisis. Grech (2015) presents 
evidence that the impacts of the crisis were different for continental and Mediterranean 
systems, where pension benefits of the later were cut back significantly.  
Natali and Stamanti (2014) analyse pension reforms in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain, between, 1990 and 2013, concluding that all countries encouraged the spread of 
private pensions and harmonised their fragmented public schemes. In addition, cost 
containment was massive, putting future adequacy at risk.   
Natali (2015) provides a summary of reforms in Europe since the onset of the Great 
Recession, showing that evidence proves that austerity has hit both public pay-as-you-go 
schemes and private pre-funded schemes alike. Indeed, both have been subject to 
measures to contain costs (e.g., a higher pensionable age, the introduction of automatic 
stabilisers of future spending, reduced indexation, and higher taxes and/or contributions). 
Indeed, Diamond (1996), much earlier, suggested the indexation of normal retirement age 
to life expectancy, and the investment of part of the public reserve funds in the private 
economy as being good measures to solve the social security pension system problem.  
Bloom et al. (2010) analyse the implications of population ageing for economic 
growth, concluding that the results suggest that OECD countries are likely to see modest 




reforms (including an increase in the legal age of retirement) can mitigate the economic 
consequences of an ageing population. 
In order to disentangle the macroeconomic impacts on the pay-as-you-go 
Portuguese social security system, Garcia and Lopes (2009) conclude that some 
cumulative measures such as a changing of indexing rules, a better actuarial match 
between pensions and contributions, and measures to increase the effective age of 
retirement, could have a bigger impact on reducing the expected increase in pension 
expenditure than applying a systemic pension reform. Using a macroeconomic model of 
the Portuguese economy, the estimations suggest that the elimination of early retirement 
schemes, combined with an increase in the effective contribution rate could be a good 
alternative to promote the financial sustainability of the system. Economic growth 
strengthened by the pension reserve fund (which had an average annual nominal rate of 
return of 5.17% during the period 1989-2014, and relatively low administrative costs 
compared with funded systems), brings more advantages to the system when compared 
with a fully pre-funded system, which has high transition costs, with current tax payers 
being responsible for paying both their own and the existing pensioners benefits 
(European Parliament, 2011).  
This paper analyses the factors that influence the evolution of Portuguese pension 
expenditure, including the most recent developments on relevant variables.  
Methods 
Sample 
In order to study the determinants of pension expenditures, we adopt the ratio between 
pension spending and gross domestic product at current prices as the dependent variable 




The independent variables consider eight factors that might influence pension 
expenditure. The first group of factors follows the related literature concerning the 
macroeconomic and demographic characteristics: 
(1) Unemployment consists of unemployed people defined as someone aged 15 to 64 
without work during the reference week, available to start work within the next 
two weeks (or has already found a job to start within the next three months), and 
has actively sought employment at some time during the last four weeks. In pay-
as-you-go systems, the unemployment shrinks the contribution base, negatively 
affecting the pension system balance. 
(2)  Apparent labor productivity denotes apparent productivity of labor that relates 
the wealth created to the labor factor. The apparent labor productivity is the real 
gross domestic product in terms of expenditure, at constant prices of 2011, per 
annual hours worked by employed people. Apparent labor productivity presents 
the potential to overcome the negative effects of ageing, positively affecting the 
pension system balance. 
(3) Old age dependency ratio is the ratio between elderly people at an age when they 
are generally economically inactive (i.e. aged 65 and over) and the number of 
people of working age (i.e. 15 - 64 years old). This variable is expected to have a 
positive effect on the dependent variable. 
The second group tries to disentangle the impact of the main pension system laws 
since 1975 (Garcia, 2017). Therefore, five dummy variables were set, each of which refers 
to a specific period, that is to say, the variable’s value will be 1 if included in that specific 




(4) Revolution of April 1974, which led to important social and economic changes 
during the second half of the ‘70s. This variable is expected to have a positive 
effect on the dependent variable. 
(5) The first Social Security Act of 1984, which established pension benefit payments 
in the private sector. This variable is also expected to have a positive effect on the 
dependent variable. 
(6) The Social Security Reform of 1993, which made changes to the social security 
system of the Public Administration (civil servants), in order to be similar with 
that of the private sector. This reform considers a new formula for the calculation 
of public employees’ pensions, which is the same as that of the private sector 
workers’ scheme. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on the 
dependent variable. 
(7) The Third Social Security Act of 2002, which considered parametric changes to 
the old age pension benefit formula, including the accrual rate and life-time 
earnings. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on the dependent 
variable. 
(8) The Fourth Social Security Act of 2007, which introduced the sustainability factor 
and the voluntary public regime of capitalisation. The sustainability factor is the 
ratio between average life expectancy at the age of 65 in 2000 and average life 
expectancy at the age of 65 for the year prior to the year for which the pension 
benefit is calculated. This Act also increases the penalty for early retirement to 





We conduct linear regression analysis using annual time series data from 1974 to 
2015. The equation of the model is: 
(1)𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋3𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐷1𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐷2𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷3𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐷4𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐷5𝑡 + 𝑡 
Where 𝑌 is the ratio between pension spending and gross domestic product; 𝑋1 is 
the unemployment in logarithmic form; 𝑋2 is the apparent labor productivity in 
logarithmic form; 𝑋3 is the old age dependency ratio; and  𝐷1 to 𝐷5 represent dummy 





= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 apparent labor productivity𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑒𝑣1974𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑅1984𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝑅1993𝑡 +  𝛿3𝑅2002𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑅2007𝑡 + 𝑡 
The data sources are PORDATA and OECD.   
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in the 
appendix (Table A1). 
Analysis 
To test for stationarity, unit root tests were undertaken (Wooldridge, 2009). Following 
the methodology adopted by Brooks (2014), the tests used were the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test. The p-values analysis of both tests suggests that the 
null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected in all variables at 10% 
significance level, and that stationarity is achieved with first differences through the 
rejection of the same null hypothesis at 5% significance level, highlighting their strong 
persistence (I(1) process).  
The finding of non-stationarity may render the potential econometric results 




is desirable to obtain I(0) residuals, which are only achieved if the linear combination of 
I(1) variables is I(0), that is to say, if the variables are co-integrated (Brooks, 2014). 
With regards to the hypothesis of the existence of more than one linearly 
independent co-integration relationship between more than two variables, it is appropriate 
to stress the issue of co-integration using the Johansen VAR test. To develop the Johansen 
VAR framework, the selection of the optimum number of lags is needed to avoid 
problems of residual autocorrelation, using the VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
procedure. The Likelihood Ratio Criteria (LR), the Final Predictor Error (FPE), and the 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQ) selected two lags as an optimum limit, against 
the evidence of the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SC), which presented the optimum selection of three and one lag, respectively.  
The Johansen co-integration test allows for the selection of the appropriate lag 
length and model to choose. The test result suggests that the number of appropriated lags 
is two (as referred before), with one co-integrating vector, and the model to adopt consists 
of the allowance of a quadratic deterministic trend, with intercept and trend in the co-
integration equation and intercept in VAR, following Akaike Information Criteria 
(Brooks, 2014). 
Therefore, it was decided to use an error correction model “incorporated” into a 
VAR framework in order to model the short and long-run relationships between variables: 
a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The VECM can be set up in the following 
form (Brooks, 2014):  
(2) ∆𝛾𝑡 = П𝛾𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛤1∆𝛾𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑘−1∆𝛾𝑡−(𝑘−1) + 𝑢𝑡 
 where П= (Σ𝑖=1
𝑘 𝛽𝑖) − 𝐼𝑔 and 𝛤𝑖 = (𝛴𝑗=1




This VECM contains g variables in first-differenced form on the LHS, and k-1 
lags of the dependent variables (differences) on the RHS, each with a Γ short-run 
coefficient matrix. П consists of a long-run coefficient matrix, as being in equilibrium, 
all the ∆𝛾𝑡−𝑖 = 0, and setting 𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 0 will leave П𝑦𝑡−𝑘= 0. П illustrates the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium, that is to say, it measures the proportion of last period´s 
equilibrium error that it is corrected for (Brooks, 2014). 
The VECM model estimation is depicted in Table 1 and encompasses the co-
integration equation with dummy variables. 
Table 1. VECM estimation 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 
 Sample (adjusted): 1978 to 2014 
 Included observations: 37 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 Determinant residual covariance (dof adj.) 9.01E-11 
 Determinant residual covariance  9.35E-12 
 Log likelihood  259.8113 
 Akaike information criterion -10.36818 
 Schwarz criterion -7.407571 
Pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio (-1)  1.000000 
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 R-squared  0.685045  0.413290  0.802777  0.842369 
 Adj. R-squared  0.460078 -0.005789  0.661903  0.729776 
 Sum sq. resids  0.304910  0.377908  0.002904  0.186175 
 S.E. equation  0.120497  0.134148  0.011760  0.094157 
 F-statistic  3.045086  0.986188  5.698563  7.481515 
 Log likelihood  36.27442  32.30368  122.3691  45.40105 
 Akaike AIC -1.095914 -0.881280 -5.749681 -1.589246 
 Schwarz SC -0.399301 -0.184667 -5.053068 -0.892633 
 Mean dependent  0.124324  0.023130  0.020237  0.367568 
 S.D. dependent  0.163987  0.133761  0.020226  0.181129 
 
As all inverse roots of characteristic polynomial are inside the unit circle, the 
model is stable. The residuals assumptions were tested, and it is possible to conclude that 
the mean of the residuals is zero. The White Heteroscedasticity test p-value does not allow 
for the rejection of homoscedastic residuals. In addition, the covariance between residuals 
and explanatory variables is zero, thus satisfying the assumption of there being no 




hypothesis of no residual serial correlation is not rejected at 5% significance level with 
the use of two lags.  
As such, the estimators are efficient, and the confidence intervals and hypothesis 
tests using t and F-statistics are reliable. 
Results 
The results suggest that the long-run relationship between 
pensions to gross domestic product ratio and old age dependency ratio is negative, 
whereas the long-run relationship between pensions to gross domestic product ratio and 
the other two variables (log unemployment and log apparent labor productivity) is 
positive. In fact, the normalised co-integrating model estimation (Table A.2 in the 
appendix), without dummy variables, allows one to obtain the following equation: 
(3) Pensions to gross domestic product ratio = 1.320370 log unemployment + 1.818858 log apparent labor productivity - 0.221652 old age dependency ratio  
The presence of a co-integrating vector illustrates an equilibrium phenomenon, as 
it is possible that co-integrated variables may deviate from their relationship in the short 
run, but that their association would return in the long run (Brooks, 2014). 
 
Discussion 
The positive long-run coefficient of log unemployment suggests that unemployment has 
a positive impact on pension system expenditure, which is in line with the literature. High 
unemployment leads to negative migratory balances (mostly affecting young people), 
aggravating the ageing process, and consequently the declining demographics. With less 
people, investment decreases, shrinking the economic growth. The causality from ageing 
and unemployment to productivity are confirmed by a VEC Granger Causality Test, at 




The positive long-run coefficient of log apparent labor productivity on pensions 
to gross domestic product ratio is not in line with the European Commission (2015).  
Concerning the negative coefficient of old age dependency ratio, this might be the 
consequence of the parametric changes introduced to the system since 2000 (Garcia, 
2017), especially the one that changed the normal retirement age (NRA) to 66 years old, 
in 2013, becoming life expectancy-dependent after 2014. Therefore, an increase of old 
age dependency ratio does not compulsorily imply an increase of pension expenditure as 
a share of gross domestic product in the long-run. This measure is strongly supported by 
the literature as a crucial measure to guarantee the financial sustainability of pension 
systems, smoothing the impact of an ever-increasing number of pensioners (Diamond, 
1996; Clements et al., 2015). The introduction of a sustainability factor into the benefit 
calculation formula, which is related to the evolution of average life expectancy (ALE), 
also represents a significant decrease in the pension benefit.  
With regards to the short-run coefficients of the dummy variables, only the 
revolution of April 1974 (at 10% significance level) and the 1993 Social Security Reform 
(at 5%) present statistical significance, and the negative coefficients illustrate each 
contribution to the decrease of pension expenditure as a share of gross domestic product, 
where the possible causes can be the high average real gross domestic product growth 
rate after 1976 until 1979 of 5.4% in the first case (PORDATA), and in the latter case, 
the implementation of the same official retirement age between men and women, as well 
as the increase of the minimum contributory period from 10 to 15 years. 
Finally, the impulse-response functions were stressed, as well as the variance 
decomposition for pensions to gross domestic product ratio, which is strongly dependent 




In order to guarantee some consistency and reasonability of the results, the order 
considered was from the most exogenous variable to the most endogenous one, 
determined by a VEC Granger Causality Test. The higher the p-value, the greater the 
exogeneity of the variable. The adopted order is as follows: old-age dependency ratio, log 
unemployment, pensions to gross domestic product ratio and log apparent productivity of 
labour. 
 
Figure 1. Response to cholesky one standard deviation innovation 
Following Brooks’ (2014) methodology, Figure 1 gives the impulse responses for 
pensions to gross domestic product ratio, regarding several unit shocks to old-age 
dependency ratio and log unemployment and their impact during 20 periods (years) 
ahead. Considering the signs of the responses, innovations to old-age dependency ratio 
have a positive impact until the 5th year, achieving its peak in the 3rd year. After this, the 
impact is negative, although the effect of the shock ends up dying down. A standard 
deviation shock to log unemployment and log apparent productivity of labour always has 
a positive impact on pensions to gross domestic product ratio, reaching its peak in the 4th 
and 3rd years, respectively, and stagnating in the long-run. Finally, the own innovations 




unemployment, that is to say, it reaches its peak in the 4th year, and then stagnation 
thereafter. 
When analysing this approach, the main highlight is the fact that old-age 
dependency ratio registers an almost irrelevant contribution for the evolution of pensions 
to gross domestic product ratio in the long-run, when compared with the other variables, 
which is surpassed by the contributions of log unemployment and log apparent 
productivity of labour, this reinforcing the doubts about the contribution of ageing on 
pension expenditure.  It is also possible to verify the relevance of unemployment in the 
presence of a positive shock immediately in the first years (as stressed by the European 
Commission (2015)), over a 20-year forecasting horizon (positive but constant impact), 
shrinking the contributory base and the economic growth, with a similar pattern in relation 
to the apparent productivity of labour, guaranteeing higher pension entitlements. 
The results of the variance decomposition for the pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio residuals show that, for the 20-year forecasting horizon, the old-age 
dependency ratio shocks account for only 2.86%, in the first year, and 5.35%, in the 20th 
year,  of the variance of the pensions to gross domestic product ratio, while log 
unemployment contributes between 57.87% and 85.83%, reinforcing the huge importance 
of unemployment on pension expenditure and the reduced impact of ageing when 
compared with the other variables. It is also important to stress the own shocks of 
pensions to gross domestic product ratio, which accounts for between 39.76% and 0.93% 
of its movements.  
Limitations 
The negative relationship between pensions to gross domestic product ratio and old age 




co-integration test with dummy variables was carried out, although there is a problem in 
that the critical values may not be valid with exogenous series, such as dummy variables.  
With this test, the old age dependency ratio long-run coefficient becomes positive 
and the sign of the other two coefficients does not change. However, it is important to 
take into account the econometric limitations of this change. To derive the VECM p-
values, the VECM model with the coefficients as C(1) until C(16) was developed.  C(1) 
is the coefficient of the co-integration equation (as well as the speed of adjustment back 
to equilibrium), C(10) is the constant, C(2) up to C(9) are the short-run coefficients of the 
lagged variables (until the second lag), and C(12) until C(16) are the coefficients of the 
dummy variables. C(11) is the trend coefficient (Brooks, 2014). 
Looking at C(1), which is negative and statistically significant at 5%, this confirms 
the long-run relationship between pensions to gross domestic product ratio, log 
unemployment, log apparent labor productivity, and old-age dependency ratio, as well as 
the existence of a correction mechanism of deviations (Wooldridge, 2009). When 
carrying out the Wald Tests, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of C(4)=C(5)=0, 
C(6)=C(7)=0 and C(8)=C(9)=0, and the conclusion that needs to be stressed is the 
absence of short-run causality running from log unemployment, 
log apparent labor productivity, and old age dependency ratio to pensions to gross 
domestic product ratio. 
In addition, the results need to be analysed carefully: if the order of variables 
changes, then the results of impulse-response functions and variance decomposition can 
change drastically, mainly the variance decomposition between pensions to gross 
domestic product ratio and log unemployment. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that 





The results of the estimation, after taking into consideration certain aspects such as non-
stationarity, co-integration, and residuals testing, suggest that unemployment, apparent 
productivity of labour, and old-age dependency ratio all jointly present a long-run 
relationship with pension expenditure as a share of gross domestic product, but not in the 
short-run. 
Unemployment is crucial to explain the increase of pension expenditure as a share 
of gross domestic product, as reinforced by the review of the literature on pensions. This 
interpretation is confirmed by the variance decomposition of pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio and also the impulse-response functions. 
The apparent productivity of labour also seems to have a positive impact on 
pension expenditure to gross domestic product, which is not in line with the European 
Commission (2015), supporting the assumption that gross domestic product growth is 
larger than pension expenditure growth in Portugal, due to the fact that pensions are not 
fully indexed to wages after retirement.  
The most intriguing result concerns the old-age dependency ratio. In fact, after the 
development of the Johansen co-integration tests, both without dummy variables and with 
dummy variables, the old-age dependence ratio long-run coefficient presents different 
signs, giving rise to the hypothesis that ageing may not be the most relevant factor which 
jeopardises the financial sustainability of the Portuguese public pension system. This fact 
is corroborated by the irrelevant influence of old-age dependency ratio (in the long-run) 
on the impulse-response-functions.  
When designing a pension system policy to reinforce its financial sustainability, 




increasing demographic strain seems not to impact pension expenditure as critically as 
unemployment. Therefore, policies to reduce unemployment should be considered as 
policy options to control pension expenditure, which represents a brand new way to 
address the financial sustainability of public pension systems.  
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Dependent variable         
 Pensions to gross 
domestic product ratio  
5.05 5.15 7.70 2.20 1.28 0.16 2.82 0.28 
(0.89) 
Independent variables         





Log apparent labor 
productivity 
2.69 2.77 3.01 2.18 0.28 -0.53 2.03 3.43 
(0.18) 
Old age dependency 
ratio 
22.35 22.00 30.70 16.30 4.09 0.33 1.94 2.61 
 (0.27) 
Number of observations 40 
The probability is between brackets 
 
Table A2. Johansen Co-integration Test without Dummy Variables 
Sample (adjusted): 1978 2014 
Included observations: 37 after adjustments 
Trend assumption: Quadratic deterministic trend 
Series: Pensions to gross domestic product ratio Log unemployment Log apparent labor productivity Old age dependency ratio 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2 
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace) 




Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.584823  62.45298  55.24578 0.0102 
At most 1  0.442063  29.92813  35.01090  0.1580 
At most 2  0.155065  8.338298     18.39771  0.6481 
At most 3  0.055277  2.103951  3.841466  0.1469 
 Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen 0.05   
    Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.584823  32.52485  30.81507  0.0306 
At most 1  0.442063  21.58983  24.25202  0.1082 
At most 2  0.155065  6.234347  17.14769  0.7936 
At most 3  0.055277  2.103951  3.841466  0.1469 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 Unrestricted Co-integrating Coefficients (normalised by b'*S11*b=I):  
Pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio  





 6.459502 -8.528931 -11.74891  1.431758 
 
 1.636999 -6.766814 -37.79332 -1.097487 
 
 6.475763 -3.688677 -25.99676 -0.853253 
 
-1.854818  3.512219  20.29810 -2.584471 
 
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
D(Pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio) 
-0.049258  0.008812 -0.016745 -0.027399 
D(Log unemployment)  0.049632  0.030766 -0.012136 -0.015591 
D(Log apparent labor 
productivity) 




D(Old age dependency ratio) -0.029153  0.014410  0.032894 -0.001872 
1 Co-integrating Equation(s): Log likelihood  216.0536 
Normalized co-integrating coefficients (standard error in brackets) 
Pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio 





 1.000000 -1.320370 (0.163) -1.818858 (0.936)  0.221652 (0.082) 
 
 
      
    
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in brackets) 
D(Pensions to gross domestic 
product ratio) 
-0.318180 (0.16656) 
   
D(Log unemployment)  0.320601 (0.12175) 
   
D(Log apparent labor 
productivity) 
-0.047652 (0.01652) 
   
D(Old age dependency ratio) -0.188316 (0.11411) 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
